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Abstract 
People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have been reported to show 
atypical attention and evaluative processing, in particular for social stimuli such 
as faces. The usual measure in these studies is an explicit, subjective judgment, 
which is the culmination of complex-temporally extended processes that are not 
typically dissected in detail.  Here we addressed a neglected aspect of social 
decision-making in order to gain further insight into the underlying mechanisms: 
the temporal evolution of the choice.  We investigated this issue by quantifying 
the alternating patterns of gaze onto faces, as well as nonsocial stimuli, while 
subjects had to decide which of the two stimuli they preferred. Surprisingly, the 
temporal profile of fixations relating to choice (the so-called “gaze cascade”) was 
entirely normal in ASD, as were the eventual preference choices. Despite these 
similarities, we found two key abnormalities:  People with ASD made choices 
more rapidly than did control subjects across the board, and their reaction times 
for social preference judgments were insensitive to choice difficulty. We suggest 
that ASD features an altered decision-making process when basing choice on 
social preferences.  One hypothesis motivated by these data is that a choice 
criterion is reached in ASD regardless of the discriminability of the options.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a pervasive developmental disorder 
characterized by impairments in social and cognitive processing.  One of the core 
diagnostic criteria for this disorder is a deficit in social communication and social 
interaction (DSM-V), which presents in real-life interactions as an inattention to 
faces and reduced eye contact, in addition to more complex social deficits such 
as difficulty recognizing emotional expressions and relating to others.   Several 
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hypotheses propose that motivational or attentional social deficits in early life 
could disrupt a critical phase in normal brain development, during which early 
social orienting typically lays the framework for more complex social and 
cognitive processes to develop later in life (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & 
Schultz, 2012; Dawson et al., 2002; 2004).  In people with ASD, these early-
onset motivational deficits may cause reduced social orienting and learning from 
a young age, resulting in decreased attending to social stimuli, which further 
disrupts normal development of cognitive processes related to social perception 
(Mundy & Neal, 2000).  
 
A large number of studies examining these social impairments have found a 
reduced attentional bias towards faces in ASD.  When viewing complex social 
scenes, people with autism make fewer initial fixations to the person and to the 
face within a scene relative to controls, indicating there is reduced spontaneous 
attentional capture by social stimuli (Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson, Frank, & 
Findlay, 2009).  Similarly, in a selective attention task for which controls are 
unable to ignore irrelevant faces, people with ASD were found to be un-
distracted, leading the authors to suggest that a deficit in the automatic 
processing of faces may underlie the diminished attentional bias for faces 
(Remington, Campbell, & Swettenham, 2012).   
 
In addition to the reduced saliency of faces for people with autism, many studies 
have found that when people with ASD do fixate on faces, the pattern of visual 
behavior with respect to facial features differs from neurotypical viewing 
behavior. The exact nature of these differences, however, is far from clear.  
Some studies report reduced gaze to the eyes and increased reliance on 
information in the mouth region (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; 
Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007) while other studies that similarly report 
reduced gaze to the eyes find little difference in gaze to the mouth region 
(Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008; Dalton et al., 2005).  Pelphrey and colleagues 
even reported reduced fixation time to all socially-salient regions of the face, 
including the eyes, nose, and mouth, and increased gaze to non-feature regions 
of the face (Pelphrey et al., 2002).  The variable results have been attributed to a 
number of factors, including experimental differences in stimulus type (e.g., 
static/dynamic, computer-generated/real faces) and task demand (e.g., emotion 
judgment, gaze direction, etc.).  However, a growing number of studies also 
propose that discrepant results arise, in part, due to the use of compensatory 
mechanisms or atypical processing strategies during certain types of face 
perception tasks, particularly by individuals who are high-functioning (Harms, 
Martin, & Wallace, 2010; Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Rice, Moriuchi, Jones, & Klin, 
2012; Rutherford & McIntosh, 2006). 
 
Abnormal gaze behavior in ASD is often accompanied by difficulties evaluating 
social information conveyed by faces, such as recognizing emotional 
expressions.  Again, the findings are inconsistent, but some behavioral studies 
have found impaired recognition of basic emotions in ASD: compared to their 
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neurotypical counterparts, people with autism are slower and less accurate in 
identifying certain negative emotional expressions such as anger, fear, and 
sadness (Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Bal et al., 2009;  
Wallace, Coleman, & Bailey, 2008), though basic emotion recognition might still 
be preserved in high-functioning individuals (Castelli, 2005).  There is stronger 
evidence, however, in support of impairments recognizing complex emotions, 
such as jealousy and trustworthiness, and making higher-level social judgments 
from faces that involve attributions of mental state (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 
2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997).  Moreover, deficits in the 
ability to recognize facial expressions of emotions such as fear (Pelphrey et al., 
2002) and sadness by people with ASD (Corden et al., 2008) are correlated with 
abnormal gaze to central features of the face, and particularly the eyes.  
 
Two highly relevant aspects of social processing have, however, not been much 
investigated:  our preference decisions among social stimuli, and the temporal 
evolution of preference-based choices.  First, most of the research on face 
processing to date focuses on emotion recognition or face perception in general, 
and few studies have investigated how these factors can influence our 
preferences of faces.  Thus far, much of the research examining visual behavior 
in ASD has focused on atypical visual behavior and the nature of these 
impairments specifically in the context of objective decision-making, such as 
correctly identifying emotional expressions.  What is unknown, however, is 
whether these reported deficits also extend to making more subjective decisions, 
such as those involving face preference or attractiveness, which are just as 
relevant to social functioning, perhaps even more so.  Secondly, it remains 
unknown how abnormal social judgments about faces might arise—what is the 
timecourse and possible underlying mechanism as atypical choices unfold? 
 
Previous studies in typically developed individuals have investigated the 
cognitive processes involved in making preference choices. One class of models 
is known as drift diffusion models (DDM) and was initially proposed by Ratcliff 
and colleagues to describe two-choice decision processes (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff 
& McKoon, 2008).  These models assume that evidence for each alternative is 
accumulated and integrated over time until a decision threshold is reached.  
More recent studies have shown that integrating eyetracking data as an 
additional parameter in the DDM results in a model that better predicts choice 
and possibly reaction times (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010). 
 
Similar in form to the drift diffusion models is the gaze cascade phenomenon 
proposed by Shimojo and colleagues (S. Shimojo, Simion, E. Shimojo, & 
Scheier, 2003), emphasizing the behavioral dynamics of preference choice.  In 
their model, it is proposed that preference and gaze mutually interact in a positive 
feedback loop to produce an effect known as a “gaze cascade.”  Given a choice 
between two stimuli, individuals are initially just as likely to inspect one image in 
the pair as the other. However, in the few seconds before a preference decision 
is made, an increasing gaze bias occurs toward the eventually-chosen stimulus. 
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Shimojo and colleagues propose that in the moments before this decision is 
made, a positive feedback pathway is engaged in which the gaze bias towards 
the to-be-chosen image leads to increased preference, which in turn increases 
gaze bias further, and so on, until the preference signal surpasses threshold 
leading to a behavioral decision. Thus in this model, gaze orienting is intrinsically 
linked to and necessary for decision-making and vice versa.  Indeed, further 
evidence supporting the reciprocal effect of gaze on preference formation is 
demonstrated in experiment 2 of the same paper and a follow-up study using 
fMRI (Ito et al., 2014).  In both studies, one face in a pair is presented on screen 
for a longer duration than the other face.  After several repetitions, participants 
report a preference bias for the longer-presented face, indicating that 
manipulation of gaze can directly influence preference decisions.  While the gaze 
cascade effect has been observed in other studies examining preference choice 
(Noguchi & Stewart, 2014; Simion & Shimojo, 2006), the effect may also extend 
to other types of visual decision-making tasks (Fiedler, 2012; Glaholt & Reingold, 
2009; Wiener, Hölscher, Büchner, & Konieczny, 2011). 
 
Given that the literature suggests atypical viewing behavior in ASD is 
accompanied by deficits in processing social information, the current study 
sought to examine the influence of gaze on preference choice in autism and, 
specifically, whether eye movements reveal a fundamentally different evaluation 
process in ASD.  Eye-tracking was used to investigate gaze behavior in adults 
with high-functioning autism while they made preference decisions amongst pairs 
of social and non-social stimuli.  Since direct gaze can elicit atypical visual 
behavior in ASD, we utilized face stimuli depicting open eyes as well as closed 
eyes so that we could determine whether a potentially abnormal “gaze cascade” 
effect was caused by an avoidance of direct gaze, or rather an overall difficulty in 
making self-paced preference judgments for faces.  Furthermore, we tested 
whether the typically robust gaze cascade would remain intact under time 
pressure by using a time restriction in one block.  Consistent with evidence that 
individuals with ASD have difficulty evaluating and making social judgments 
about faces, and given evidence of reduced attention to faces and direct gaze in 
ASD, we predicted that the ASD group would not have a normal gaze cascade, 
take longer than controls to make preference choices regarding faces, and end 
up making unusual preference choices.  To our surprise, we found an essentially 
typical gaze cascade, normal final preferences, and faster decision times in ASD.   
 
2. MATERIALS & METHODS 
2.1. Participants 
Participants were a group of 12 high-functioning subjects with a DSM-IV 
diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (M
age
 = 35.4 years, SD = 12.8, age 
range = 22-58; Females = 3).  Sample size was determined by participant 
availability.  Diagnosis was confirmed by ADOS [Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule, (Lord et al., 2000)] and ADI-R  [Autism Diagnostic 
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Interview-Revised, (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994)] or SCQ [Social 
Communication Questionnaire, (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003)].  The 
comparison group consisted of 12 healthy controls (M
age
 = 33.3 years, SD = 
11.9, age range = 20-59; Females = 1), group-matched for age, gender, and 
IQ, with no family history of psychiatric illness.  Table 1 summarizes 
demographic and diagnostic information for participants. 
 
Independent samples t-tests showed that the groups were not significantly 
different in terms of age (t(22) = 0.44, p = .685), gender (p = .590, 2-sided 
Fisher’s Exact Test) and IQ (t(22) = -0.87, p = .392), as measured by the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999).  All participants 
gave written informed consent to participate under a protocol approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology. 
 
Table 1. Demographic and diagnostic information for participants. 
          Autism Group Autism Group: ADOS 
 Age 
Verbal 
IQ 
Full Scale 
IQ 
SOC COM+SOC 
1 58 118 126 7 9 
2 24 118 101 7 12 
3 22 102 107 14 21 
4 22 101 102 13 20 
5 42 80 93 14 20 
6 30 111 106 11 17 
7 57 119 102 8 12 
8 31 127 124 7 11 
9 26 89 93 7 10 
10 47 109 104 7 9 
11 29 117 115 14 20 
12 37 135 133 9 13 
Mean 35.4 110.5  108.8   
SD 12.8   15.5    12.9   
              Control Group   
 
 Age 
 Verbal  
IQ 
Full Scale 
IQ 
  
Mean 33.3 111.7 113.1   
SD 11.9 11.7 11.3   
a. Verbal IQ and full-scale IQ from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; ADOS: Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule; SOC: social interaction subscale; COM+SOC: communication + 
social interaction subscales.  
 
2.2. Stimuli & Apparatus 
Stimuli consisted of pairs of social stimuli (computer-generated human faces) 
or pairs of non-social stimuli (nature scenes sourced from a google image 
search for “desert” and “mountain”).  Face images, generated using Facegen 
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(Singular Inversions, Vancouver, Canada), were front-facing with neutral 
emotional expression and direct eye contact.   
 
To control for gaze bias due to differences in baseline attractiveness of the 
stimuli, all images were drawn from a larger set of face and nature scene 
stimuli pre-rated for attractiveness by a separate group of non-autistic 
participants on a scale of 1 (very unattractive) to 7 (very attractive) (n = 20, 
Females = 8; M
age
 = 28.2 years, SD = 7.5).  In accordance with the original 
gaze cascade study, images were then selected and paired such that half the 
pairs in each block had images that were equal in attractiveness pre-ratings 
(“high difficulty” trials) and the other half had a difference of 1.5 points (“low 
difficulty” trials).  Each image pair was presented in randomized order once 
per block, and the location of each image in a pair was left-right randomized.  
The two Open Eyes blocks and the Roundness block (see Fig. 1) used the 
same set of faces. For a further condition with a stricter time restriction, we 
created a novel set of face stimuli from the images that had been pre-rated by 
the same participants, in order to eliminate memory effects.  Image pairs in 
the Timed condition had the same mix of “high difficulty” and “low difficulty” 
trials as the untimed conditions.  
 
Images were presented on a 21” CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz 
and pixel resolution of 1152 x 864.  The stimuli in each test pair were 
presented simultaneously on the left and right side of the screen.  At a 
viewing distance of approximately 57 cm, each stimulus pair had an overall 
size of 36.2 (width) x 14.4 (height) degrees of visual angle. 
 
Stimuli were presented using Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA), the 
Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997), and the Eyelink toolbox 
(Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002).  Gaze data was collected using a 
head-mounted Eyelink II eye-tracking system (SR Research, Osgoode, 
Canada).  Corneal and pupil reflection were recorded at a sampling rate of 
250 Hz.  At the beginning of each block, a 9-point calibration was performed.  
Each trial began by requiring subjects to fixate on a central drift correction 
dot.  After the eye-tracker registered a successful fixation, participants 
pressed the space bar to start the trial.  
 
2.3. Procedure 
Subjects performed various 2-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks while 
eye-gaze was tracked (see Fig. 1).  Subjects inspected a pair of 
simultaneously presented stimuli, then made the 2AFC choice by pushing 
either the left or right button. In advance of the experiment, subjects 
completed 20 trials with simultaneously-presented geometrical shapes in 
which they had to indicate which of the two was a triangle. This task was 
implemented to check for basic motor response time differences between 
groups. 
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Experimental design consisted of five blocked conditions where either the 
stimulus or task instruction was varied (see Fig. 1 for summary of 
experimental conditions and sample stimuli).  In three of the blocks, 
participants made self-paced preference decisions, viewing either faces with 
open eyes (Open Eyes), faces with closed eyes (Closed Eyes), or nature 
scenes (Nature Scenes), reporting which face (or nature scene) they liked the 
most.  In another block, participants viewed open-eyed faces but instead 
made objective decisions as to which face was rounder (Roundness), again 
with no time limit.  In the fifth block, participants viewed open-eyed faces and 
made preference decisions, but were given only 1.5 seconds for each 
decision (Timed).  All blocks consisted of 40 trials, with the exception of our 
main condition of interest, Open Eyes, which consisted of 80 trials. Block 
order was counter-balanced across subjects.  
  
Lastly, we selected a subset of the images presented in the experiment (13-
14% of all images) that had been given low, average, and high attractiveness 
pre-ratings and had all participants rate this subset for attractiveness on a 
scale of 1 (very unattractive) to 7 (very attractive).  
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Condition 
Name 
Stimuli 
Description 
Example 
Stimuli 
Time per 
Trial 
Decision 
Type 
Open Eyes 
Faces with 
Open Eyes 
 
Self-paced 
(2 x 40 trials) 
Preference 
Judgment 
Closed Eyes  
Faces with 
Closed Eyes  
 
Self-paced 
(40 trials) 
Preference 
Judgment 
Timed 
Faces with 
Open Eyes 
 
1.5 seconds 
(40 trials) 
Preference 
Judgment 
Roundness 
Faces with 
Open Eyes 
 
Self-paced 
(40 trials) 
Objective 
Judgment 
Nature Scenes 
Nature 
Scenes 
 
Self-paced 
(40 trials) 
Preference 
Judgment 
 
Figure 1. Summary of experimental conditions and example stimuli. 
 
2.4. Analyses 
Data were analyzed using custom scripts written in Matlab.  In the four 
preference decision conditions (Open Eyes, Closed Eyes, Timed, and Nature 
Scenes), high difficulty trials were compared to low difficulty trials (as defined 
above in Stimuli & Apparatus).  For the objective Roundness condition, we 
defined difficulty by calculating a height to width ratio for each face, and then 
ranking the stimulus pairs according to face ratio differences.  The 20 trials 
with the smallest differences were defined as high difficulty; the largest 20 
differences, low difficulty.  
 
We used two analysis methods to examine the level of consistency in 
preference choices between the two groups.  First, we calculated a between-
group correlation of the proportion of subjects in each group that chose a 
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given image in each pair, collapsing across the two difficulty levels.  Second, 
we examined whether both groups’ preference choices in the low difficulty 
trials agreed with the attractiveness ratings made by the pre-rating group.  We 
limited this second analysis to low difficulty trials because only low difficulty 
trials had an objectively correct (i.e., higher-rated) image for the preference 
tasks, allowing us to define accuracy.  A binary logistic regression analysis 
was carried for each subject and each block, regressing the dependent 
variable of preference decision against the consensus-preferred image as 
defined by the pre-rating group.  This resulted in a set of beta weights 
representing the degree to which the higher-rated image (or rounder image in 
the case of the Roundness condition) predicted a subject’s preference 
choices in a given block.  We compared beta weights between groups using 
independent samples t-tests.   
 
To compare our gaze results to those obtained in the original gaze cascade 
study (S. Shimojo et al., 2003), a similar post-experiment analysis was 
conducted.  Eye tracking data from all trials in a condition were aligned to the 
time of decision (i.e., button press).  For each eye-tracking point from decision 
time going back to 1 second before decision time, a “true” value was assigned 
when gaze was on the to-be-chosen stimulus, and a “false” value when gaze 
was on the unchosen stimulus.   Points outside either stimulus were treated 
as “not a number.”  The ratio of “true” to “false” values for each time-point was 
averaged across trials and subjects in each group to obtain the likelihood of 
gaze bias toward the chosen stimulus at each time point.  The data from the 
ASD group and from the control group were then each fit with a four-
parameter sigmoid regression curve for each condition, with the four 
parameters representing the following: (1) bottom plateau – baseline 
comparison probability between the two stimuli, (2) top plateau – gaze bias at 
which the participant made the conscious behavioral choice, (3 & 4) point of 
inflection and slope at point of inflection – timescale indicating the quickness 
of the decision.  Lastly, 95% confidence intervals were calculated for the four 
parameter estimates.  Note that because each time point is averaged over 
multiple trials to interpolate the sigmoid function, the fit describes the time 
course of gaze probability at a given time point ahead of decision time (i.e. 
button press) rather than trial-by-trial gaze behavior.  
 
To test whether the sigmoid parameters differed significantly between groups, 
non-parametric permutation tests were used, with the difference between 
control and autism group parameter estimates as test metrics.  We reshuffled 
the group labels (ASD, Control) to create 10,000 synthetic data sets, 
calculating the sigmoid fit parameters for each.  The empirical distribution of 
the parameters was used to calculate the probability of seeing between-group 
parameter differences greater than those observed in the present study.  
Parameter estimates were considered significantly different between groups if 
the difference between estimates was in the top 2.5% or bottom 2.5% of the 
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permutation distribution for that parameter (most extreme positive or negative 
differences). 
 
Reaction times (RTs) were log-transformed prior to statistical analysis to 
rectify the positively skewed distribution.  Raw values are reported in the text 
and figures.  Trials were excluded if reaction times were greater than 3 SD 
outside the group mean, or if no valid button press was registered (< 1% of 
the data). 
 
Baseline reaction times in the preliminary geometrical shape recognition task 
were compared between groups with a one-way ANOVA.  For the five 
experimental conditions, RTs were first analyzed with a 2 x 5 repeated-
measures ANOVA, with a between-subjects factor of group (ASD, Control) 
and within-subjects factor of condition (Open Eyes, Closed Eyes, Timed, 
Roundness, Nature Scenes).  For the second level of analysis (examining the 
effect of decision difficulty on RTs), four (2 x 2 x 2) repeated-measures 
ANOVAs were carried out comparing the Open Eyes condition to each of the 
other four conditions, with a between-subjects factor of group and an 
additional two-level factor of decision difficulty (high difficulty, low difficulty).  
In RT analyses with decision difficulty as a factor, we analyzed all trials 
belonging to that difficulty level, regardless of eventual preference choice.  
Post-hoc tests were conducted when appropriate (2-tailed independent 
sample t-test, unless otherwise indicated).  Degrees of freedom were 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected when violations of sphericity occurred.  Mean 
fixation durations, fixation rates, and inverse efficiency scores were each 
analyzed with a 2 x 5 repeated-measures ANOVA, with a between-subjects 
factor of group and within-subjects factor of condition. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Fixation Behavior 
A preliminary analysis comparing mean fixation durations and fixation rates 
between groups revealed no significant interactions (ps > .663) or main 
effects of group (ps > .351).  Results are summarized in Supplemental Figure 
S1. 
 
3.2. Preference Choices  
A correlation analysis was conducted to assess the agreement between 
preference choices in the ASD and control groups (see Table 2).  There was 
a significant positive correlation between preference choices made by the two 
groups in all five conditions, four of which survived correction for multiple 
comparisons. 
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Table 2. Between-group correlation of preference choices in low and high difficulty trials combined. 
 
Open Eyes Closed Eyes Timed Roundness Nature Scenes 
Pearson’s r .676 * .445 * .389  .830 * .618 * 
p value < .001 .004 .012 < .001 < .001 
a. * p < .01 (corrected for multiple comparisons).  Note that the listed significance is uncorrected. 
To examine the degree to which each groups’ preference choices agreed with 
the attractiveness ratings made by the pre-rating group, a binary logistic 
regression analysis was carried out for the low difficulty trials, regressing the 
dependent variable of preference decision against the consensus-preferred 
image, and t-tests were performed on the resulting beta weights (see Table 
3). None of the group differences in beta weights were significant. 
 
Table 3. Results of the binary logistic regression model for low difficulty trials, regressing the dependent 
variable of preference choice against the consensus-preferred image as defined by the pre-rating group 
(beta weight means and standard errors, and p values from 2-tailed t-tests). 
 
Open Eyes Closed Eyes Timed Roundness Nature Scenes 
 Mean β SE Mean β SE Mean β SE Mean β SE Mean β SE 
Controls 4.09 1.69 1.40 0.29 4.81 2.38 16.32 2.89 4.15 2.43 
Autism 1.89 0.31 2.83 1.81 1.19 0.32 16.20 3.06 2.97 1.86 
p value   .21   .45   .15     .98   .71 
 
 
3.3. Gaze Cascade Effect  
The likelihood that an observer’s gaze was on the to-be-chosen picture was 
plotted against time before decision (see Fig. 2).  The results showed that the 
gaze cascade effect was present for both groups in all five conditions.  For 
each group, a four-parameter sigmoid function (parameters: bottom plateau, 
top plateau, point of inflection, slope at point of inflection) fit the likelihood 
curves well in all five conditions. 
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(A)      (B) 
 
(C)      (D) 
 
(E) 
 
 
Figure 2. The likelihood that a participant's gaze is directed at the to-be-chosen stimulus is plotted 
against time to decision for the autism group (red) and control group (blue) for (A) Open Eyes, (B) 
Closed Eyes, (C) Timed, (D) Roundness, and (E) Nature Scenes.  Dots represent raw data averaged 
across trials and subjects for each time point.  Four-parameter sigmoids (solid lines; Parameters: 
bottom plateau, top plateau, point of inflection, slope at point of inflection) were fit to each likelihood 
curve (all R
2
s > .942).  Shading denotes 95% confidence bounds of the sigmoid fit. 
Based on non-parametric tests using 10,000 random group assignments, we 
calculated the empirical probability of seeing parameter differences greater 
than those observed in the present study.  To test whether the sigmoid 
parameters differed significantly between groups, parameter estimates for the 
control group were subtracted from parameter estimates for the ASD group 
and compared against the probability distribution from permutations testing 
(see Methods for details).  None of the parameter differences between groups 
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in the five conditions reached p = .05 significance, even when a correction for 
multiple comparisons was not applied (see Supplemental Table S1).  
 
3.4. Reaction Times 
A one-way ANOVA comparing baseline reaction time in the preliminary 
geometrical shape recognition task confirmed the ASD and control groups did 
not differ in basic motor response times, F(1,22) = 0.02, p = .882. 
 
Reaction times for the experimental conditions were first analyzed using a 2 x 
5 ANOVA comparing all five experimental conditions (see Fig. 3).  Compared 
to controls, the ASD group had faster reaction times overall, reflected in a 
near-significant main effect of group, F(1,22) = 4.23, p = .052, η
2 
= .16.  Post-
hoc comparisons revealed significant group differences in the Closed Eyes 
condition (ASD: M = 2.16, SE = 0.32; Controls: M = 3.13, SE = 0.30), t(22) = -
2.31, p = .030, and Timed condition (ASD: M = 1.22, SE = 0.14; Controls: M = 
1.62, SE = 0.14), t(22) = -2.13, p = .045, and a trend-level group difference in 
the Open Eyes condition (ASD: M = 2.04, SE = 0.20; Controls: M = 2.77, SE 
= 0.27),  t(22) = -1.93, p = .067.  Differences in RTs in the Roundness and 
Nature Scenes conditions were not significant (p = .179 and p = .400, 
respectively).  
 
Figure 3. Mean reaction times for the preliminary geometrical shape recognition task and experimental 
conditions, for the autism (red) and control (blue) groups.  Error bars denote standard error. * p < .05, + 
p < .10. 
 
To investigate RT differences between groups in the Open Eyes condition in 
comparison to the other conditions, a (2 x 2 x 2) repeated-measures ANOVA 
(factors: group x condition x difficulty) was calculated each time comparing 
the Open Eyes condition to each of the other four experimental conditions, 
0
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Autism
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Recognition
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+ * *
Roundness
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with a between-subjects factor of group (ASD, Control) and a two-level factor 
of decision difficulty (high difficulty, low difficulty).  Means and standard errors 
for RTs in the individual conditions are shown in Table 4.   
 
Face Preference: Open Eyes vs. Closed Eyes. The ANOVA comparing the 
effect of Closed Eyes versus Open Eyes on RTs indicated there was a 
significant main effect of group, F(1,22) = 4.93, p = .037, η
2  
= .183, for faster 
RTs in the ASD group compared to the control group.  None of the other main 
effects or interactions reached significance (all ps > .146).   
 
Face Preference: Timed vs. Untimed.  The ANOVA comparing the Timed 
condition to the self-paced Open Eyes condition revealed a significant 
interaction between group and difficulty on RTs, F(1,22) = 6.12, p = .022,  η
2 
 = 
.218, as well as a trend-level three-way interaction, F(1,22) = 3.69, p = .068, η
2 
 
= .144.  Paired-samples t-tests indicated trend-level differences in the Timed 
condition for controls (Controls: High difficulty: M = 1.63, SE = 0.14; Low 
difficulty: M = 1.60, SE = 0.15), t(11) = -1.75, p = .109, but not for the ASD 
group (ASD: High difficulty: M = 1.23, SE = 0.14; Low difficulty: M = 1.21, SE 
= 0.14), t(11) = -0.73,  p = .484. There was also a significant group effect for 
faster RTs in the ASD group compared to controls, F(1,22) = 6.59, p = .018, η
2  
= .230. 
 
Face Preference vs. Face Roundness.  The ANOVA comparing the 
Roundness condition to Open Eyes revealed a significant interaction between 
condition and difficulty on RTs, F(1,22) = 15.56, p = .001,  η
2 
 = .414, as well 
as a trend-level group effect, F(1,22) = 2.99, p = .098, η
2 
 = .120.  Paired-
samples t-tests indicated both groups took significantly longer for high 
difficulty compared to low difficulty decisions in the Roundness task (Controls: 
High difficulty: M = 2.58, SE = 0.24; Low difficulty: M = 2.01, SE = 0.18), t(11) 
= -3.41, p = .006, (ASD: High difficulty: M = 2.08, SE = 0.32; Low difficulty: M 
= 1.74, SE = 0.25), t(11) = -2.66, p = .022.  
 
Social vs. Non-social Preference.  The ANOVA comparing the Nature Scenes 
condition to Open Eyes revealed a significant interaction between group and 
difficulty, F(1,22) = 7.01, p = .015, η
2 
= .242, indicating that decision difficulty 
had a different effect on RTs in the control group than on those in the ASD 
group. There was also a main effect of difficulty, F(1,22) = 4.53, p = .045, η
2 
= 
.171.  None of the other main effects or interactions reached significance (all 
ps > .177).   
 
To examine the effect of decision difficulty on RTs in each group, within-group 
comparisons were performed on pooled data from the Nature Scenes and 
Open Eyes conditions.  Paired-samples t-tests showed the control group took 
longer to make decisions in high difficulty trials compared to low difficulty trials 
(High difficulty: M = 2.85, SE = 0.29; Low difficulty: M = 2.70, SE = 0.27), t(11) 
= -2.97, p = .013, whereas there was not a significant effect of difficulty on 
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RTs in the ASD group (High difficulty: M = 2.21, SE = 0.26; Low difficulty: M = 
2.22, SE = 0.26), t(11) = 0.32, p = .757.  
 
Inverse Efficiency Scores.  Lastly, we checked for a speed-accuracy tradeoff 
by analyzing RT and accuracy together, computing inverse efficiency scores 
(i.e., reaction time divided by accuracy) for each participant and condition in 
the low difficulty trials.  A 2 x 5 ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of 
group and within-subjects factor of condition indicated there was no 
interaction between condition and group (p = .805) and no significant 
difference between groups (p = .108). 
 
There were no significant correlations between Autism Quotient scores (AQ) 
and RTs for the ASD group, nor IQ and RTs for either group.  
 
Table 4. Mean reaction times in seconds (non-transformed values) and standard errors for high and low 
difficulty trials, and mean accuracy scores for low difficulty trials.  
 
 
4. Discussion 
Here, we found that individuals with ASD and controls made similar preference 
decisions in judging the attractiveness of faces, and that they arrived at those 
decisions using similar sampling processes, displaying the “gaze cascade” 
interaction between internal preference and attention bias.  Where the ASD 
  Control Group Autism Group 
  Reaction Time Accuracy Reaction Time Accuracy 
 Condition  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Shape Recognition  0.66 0.04 99.6% 0.00 0.69 0.07 100% 0.00 
 Difficulty Level         
Open Eyes          
 High  2.89 0.30 - - 2.01 0.19 - - 
 Low  2.66 0.25 75.8% 0.03 2.07 0.21 70.4 % 0.03 
Closed Eyes          
 High 3.20 0.35 - - 2.18 0.33 - - 
 Low 3.07 0.27 65.1% 0.03 2.15 0.32 62.8% 0.04 
Timed          
 High 1.63 0.14 - - 1.23 0.14 - - 
 Low 1.60 0.15 59.6% 0.03 1.21 0.14 55.7% 0.03 
Roundness          
 High 2.58 0.24 - - 2.08 0.32 - - 
 Low 2.01 0.18 89.6% 0.06 1.74 0.25 92.5% 0.02 
Nature Scenes           
 High 2.81 0.32 - - 2.41 0.37 - - 
 Low 2.73 0.37 61.7% 0.04 2.36 0.35 65.4% 0.05 
 16 
group differed from controls was in faster decision times, and also in an 
insensitivity to task difficulty in the facial preference tasks.  Whereas reaction 
times generally increased for difficult judgments in controls, the ASD group 
responded equally quickly when judging the attractiveness of closely-matched 
faces.  
 
People with ASD made similar preference choices compared to the control 
group. Preference choices were correlated between the two groups, and the ASD 
group chose the higher-rated image with generally the same frequency as 
controls across all conditions.  Additionally, attractiveness ratings for the post-
rated subset of stimuli were strongly correlated between groups (see 
Supplemental Table S2), which strongly suggests the initial ratings used to define 
difficulty level are also appropriate for the ASD group.  In other words, face pairs 
that were defined as equally-attractive face pairs based on non-autistic pre-
ratings were also likely to be considered equally attractive by ASD subjects. 
 
With respect to visual behavior, when we examined mean fixation durations and 
mean fixation rates, no significant group differences were detected in the details 
of the gaze pattern.  Moreover, both the ASD and control groups replicated the 
gaze cascade effect observed in the original paper (S. Shimojo et al., 2003).  
That is, the feedback loop linking visual orienting with preference decisions is 
intact in ASD, which was not expected given the literature on atypical gaze to 
faces in autism.  This indicates that the ASD group used similar preference 
decision-making processes compared to neurotypicals even with social stimuli. 
Lastly, comparison of the four parameters of the gaze cascade curves using 
permutations testing revealed no significant differences between the groups in 
any of the conditions.  Thus, the process of visual orienting to the preferred 
stimulus and the temporal profile of fixations leading up to the choice exists in the 
ASD group independent of stimulus and decision type. 
 
Despite the lack of differences in decision outcomes and orienting behavior, the 
ASD group was significantly faster in making preference decisions overall.  This 
effect may seem incompatible with the lack of difference in gaze cascade fits, but 
the gaze cascade model is time-locked to the final response (decision), not 
the onset of the stimulus, thus the model is relatively insensitive to variances in 
total performance time (RT), as well as the initial response (gaze) to the stimulus. 
The source of the speeded responses is unclear, but the data do contain some 
suggestive clues. First, the lack of significant group differences in the gaze 
cascade model fits strongly suggests that the processing advantage is not due to 
an abbreviated or otherwise abnormal feedback loop linking foveation and 
eventual preference. Second, post-hoc tests indicated that the main reaction time 
advantage stemmed mainly from faster response times in preference decisions 
for faces, as opposed to the objective face decisions or the decisions for natural 
scenes, and that there was a complete lack of a reaction time advantage in the 
geometrical shape discrimination. This suggests that the mechanism lies in a 
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higher-level component of preferential decision-making for faces, rather than in 
low-level motor, visual or executive factors. 
 
Our other analyses of fixation behavior did not point to a particular source of the 
speeded responses.  However, we did find an isolated effect of shorter latencies 
to first face fixation in the Timed condition for ASD (see Supplemental Figure 
S1C).  A future study focusing on this high-pressure condition may be able to 
uncover more informative results regarding the early phases of preference 
formation. 
 
Given the faster reaction times in ASD, we also examined whether the difficulty 
of the decision affects reaction times.  Interestingly, the ASD group was 
insensitive to the difficulty of the decision, whereas controls had slower reaction 
times when images were similarly rated, as expected.  Most intriguingly, this 
insensitivity was strongest for face preference decisions: difficulty did increase 
RTs for face roundness judgments in ASD.  Our failure to find any robust RT 
differences in the nature scenes condition may have been due to lack of 
statistical power.  It is worth noting that even in controls there was not a strong 
effect of difficulty for nature scenes.  Thus, RTs in the ASD group seem to be 
particularly insensitive to decision difficulty for social preference decisions.  
 
We found no evidence to indicate the faster RTs were due to inattention or a 
random or rushed decision-making process. The ASD group’s preferences were 
not divergent from or noisier than the control group’s preferences.  The strong 
correlation of the ASD group’s choices with both the control group’s choices and 
the attractiveness pre-ratings from a separate non-autistic group indicates the 
ASD group used similar or convergent criteria to evaluate attractiveness.  Finally, 
the lack of a group difference in inverse efficiency scores reflects that faster RTs 
were not accompanied by a disproportionately large decrease in accuracy in 
ASD (i.e., there was not a corresponding loss in performance).  Thus, one 
possible explanation could be that a choice criterion is reached in social 
decisions regardless of the discriminability of the options, although the 
fundamental mechanism underlying the choice decision may be shared between 
groups.  Future studies with more formal modeling approaches than the methods 
used here would be needed to test this hypothesis. 
 
There is precedent for the idea that people with ASD may be faster on certain 
kinds of timed visual/perceptual tasks.  A study by Hayashi and colleagues 
reported that children with Asperger’s Syndrome scored higher than typically 
developing children on the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test (RSPM) 
(Hayashi, Kato, Igarashi, & Kashima, 2008), a nonverbal intelligence test in 
which subjects identify the missing geometric element that completes a specific 
pattern.   Another study using the RSPM found that while people with autism 
performed the test with the same accuracy as controls (Soulières et al., 2009), 
their response times were significantly faster, suggesting that in certain situations 
visual processing was enhanced in ASD.  There is also evidence to indicate 
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people with ASD can outperform neurotypicals in tasks involving mental rotation 
(Soulières, Zeffiro, Girard, & Mottron, 2011), visual search (Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1997; Keehn et al., 2008) and visual discrimination (Joseph, Keehn, 
Connolly, Wolfe, & Horowitz, 2009). The explanations given for such results 
include an underlying local processing advantage, lack of engagement with 
stimuli allowing for more efficient processing, or perhaps fundamental differences 
in motivational state.  
 
One contrast between the above results and our results is that our task is 
ostensibly social in nature, a domain in which people with ASD are generally 
thought to be at a disadvantage. There are a few related factors that could help 
to interpret this discrepancy. First, it is known that individuals with autism can 
mitigate social deficits using explicitly and implicitly guided compensatory 
strategies, masking social impairments in spite of atypical processing of social 
stimuli.  The effectiveness of such explicit top-down strategies has been found in 
tasks involving facial discrimination and emotion recognition (Rutherford & 
McIntosh, 2006; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001; Wong, Fung, Chua, & McAlonan, 
2008).  Similarly, implicit compensatory strategies, such as prioritizing of local 
over configural information (Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Rondan & 
Deruelle, 2007) are reported to underlie the performance advantage observed in 
ASD relative to controls in certain types of face perception tasks (Hobson, 
Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Langdell, 1978; Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson, & Stirling, 
1989).  Second, it may be that the face preference task does not involve higher-
level social judgments.  The task regarded personal preferences, and did not 
require mental state inferences or social attributions regarding the face or other 
potential viewers, domains in which high-functioning individuals are more likely to 
show impairments compared to lower-level social processes that are often 
spared. In that sense, the task might even have been approached as a 
perceptual task, rather than a social one. This would be consistent with the faster 
RTs observed in ASD, and also the insensitivity of RTs to the relative 
attractiveness of the faces. Finally, it could be the case that face processing 
deficits in high-functioning ASD become apparent only when there are more 
complex attentional demands, such as in real-life situations, or when there is 
competing visual information, such as with dynamic stimuli. This could also occur 
if attentional demands become too great to sustain explicit or implicit 
compensatory strategies. 
 
 
The current study had several limitations.  First, while the use of computer-
generated faces is favorable in terms of controlling for potential confounds (e.g., 
facial expression), social stimuli with greater ecological validity (such as 
photographs or dynamic stimuli) may be more likely to elicit atypical gaze 
behavior, particularly in individuals with high-functioning autism.  Second, the 
difficulty factor was predefined based on ratings obtained from a separate group 
of non-autistic participants.  Due to time limitations during the actual experiment, 
we obtained post-ratings for only a small portion of the stimuli that were used. 
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While we chose images that reflected a range of attractiveness ratings, people 
with ASD may have different face preferences that were not captured by the 
stimuli presented in the post-rating set. Future directions include gathering 
ratings for all stimuli to be presented in the study and using these ratings to 
determine face pairings separately for each group, in order to eliminate the 
possibility that the two groups perceived task difficulty differently. 
 
In summary, individuals with high-functioning autism have a similar gaze cascade 
and also made similar preference choices across the stimuli compared to 
neurotypicals.  We can therefore conclude that in individuals with high-
functioning autism, the preference formation mechanism linking gaze orienting 
and eventual choice is intact.  With these similarities in mind however, there were 
two major differences between groups: reaction times in the autism group were 
faster compared to controls and furthermore, they were insensitive to the 
difficulty of the choice. Thus, more detailed analysis of task difficulty, reaction 
times, and even face preferences would help here, and in the future, to 
determine whether subjective decisions about faces systematically differ in 
people with ASD. Especially, it may worth paying attention to the initial phase of 
orienting and perceptual processing leading up to the preference decision, as 
discussed above.  In future work, researchers might investigate the extent to 
which deficits in processing social information affect preference decisions using 
dynamic or emotional stimuli.  
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Supplementary 
(A) 
   
(B) 
   
(C) 
 
Figure S1. (A) Mean fixation duration (B) mean fixation rate and (C) latency to first fixation on either stimulus 
for the autism (red) and control (blue) groups.  Error bars denote standard error. * p < .05,  but main effect of 
group across conditions was not significant, p = .132, η
2 
= .10. 
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Table S1.  Permutation Analysis: Summary table of coefficient estimates for four-parameter sigmoid fits 
(parameters: bottom plateau, top plateau, point of inflection, slope at point of inflection), 95% confidence 
intervals for estimates, and probability of observed difference in parameters from random group sampling.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S2. Post-ratings of stimuli subset by control and autism participants (13-14% of all images presented 
in study) and between-group correlation of ratings.  A subset of the images covering a range of 
attractiveness ratings (low, average, and high) were rated by all participants for attractiveness on a scale of 
1 (very unattractive) to 7 (very attractive). 
Stimulus Type Mean Rating SD Pearson’s r p value 
Female Faces     
Controls 3.27 1.02 .784* .004 
Autism 3.35 0.59   
Male Faces     
Controls 3.23 1.16 .739* .009 
Autism 2.81 0.45   
Desert Scenes     
Controls 4.14 1.00 .914** < .001 
Autism 4.37 0.46   
Mountain Scenes     
Controls 4.64 1.08 .942** < .001 
Autism 5.08 0.76   
a. * p < .0125, ** p < .0025 (corrected for multiple comparisons).  Note that the listed significance is 
uncorrected. 
 
 
  Control Group Autism Group p (observed  
 Condition Parameter Estimate 95% CIs Estimate 95% CIs difference) 
 Open Eyes Bottom Plateau 0.438 [0.435, 0.442] 0.449 [0.441, 0.450] .44 
 POI 134.0 [132.9, 135.0] 154.9 [152.8,157.1] .29 
 Slope 0.003  0.002  .89 
 Top Plateau 0.845 [0.838, 0.851] 0.855 [0.841, 0.867] .44 
 R
2
 0.997  0.996   
Closed Eyes Bottom Plateau 0.446 [0.443, 0.449] 0.485 [0.482, 0.489] .33 
 POI 137.6 [136.5, 138.6] 162.9 [160.6,165.2] .23 
 Slope 0.003  0.003  .59 
 Top Plateau 0.837 [0.831, 0.844] 0.855 [0.843, 0.867] .41 
 R
2
 0.997  0.993   
Timed Bottom Plateau 0.458 [0.454, 0.461] 0.463 [0.457, 0.469] .46 
 POI 176.5 [174.1, 178.9] 149.0 [146.0, 152.0] .82 
 Slope 0.004  0.003  .62 
 Top Plateau 0.800 [0.786, 0.813] 0.710 [0.699, 0.721] .91 
 R
2
 0.979  0.942   
Roundness Bottom Plateau 0.508 [0.504, 0.512] 0.477 [0.471, 0.483] .62 
 POI 169.0 [166.2, 171.9] 144.0 [140.6, 147.4] .68 
 Slope 0.003  0.002  .80 
 Top Plateau 0.865 [0.851, 0.878] 0.745 [0.731, 0.760] .78 
 R
2
 0.990  0.982   
Nature Scenes Bottom Plateau 0.428 [0.420, 0.436] 0.426 [0.416, 0.436] .51 
 POI 138.1 [135.3, 140.9] 139.7 [136.9,142.4] .49 
 Slope 0.002  0.002  .52 
 Top Plateau 0.777 [0.762, 0.792] 0.899 [0.876, 0.922] .14 
 R
2
 0.983  0.996   
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Highlights 
 Both control and autism groups displayed the same feedback loop linking 
gaze and preference.  
 Preference choices were consistent across autism and control groups. 
 People with autism made more rapid preference choices.  
 Reaction times in autism were insensitive to task difficulty. 
 
